2 rational or democratic solutions, at least in comparison with more revolutionary ideologies like communism. But liberals' sense of living on the margins is also a consequence of the context in which liberalism was born. In Europe, the spectre of the French Revolution -and, later, the Bolshevik Revolution -gave liberalism a specific flavour. Liberals were often keen on reform, but they always feared social upheaval. Time and again, liberals found themselves in power only to lose control of the pace of social change. In the worst cases -1815, 1848 or 1917 spring to mind -this put the liberal cause back by generations. For much of modern European history, to be a liberal was to be in a perpetual state of siege.
Of course, one can easily raise questions about this narrative. Those on the left have long accused liberals of wielding far more power than they will admit. Most recently, the advent of an all-conquering global neoliberalism has renewed this rhetoric. Today's selfconfessed liberals might plead marginality, but there are many Europeans who would disagree, as the Greek debt crisis has amply demonstrated. 1 Likewise, the benign narrative of liberalism as a beacon of good sense and moderation in a sea of hostile ideologies has repeatedly run up against the rocky shores of imperialism. The zeal with which many liberals endorsed colonising projects in India or Algeria -and, some would argue, in Iraq or Afghanistan in the twenty-first century -sits uncomfortably with the idea that liberalism has always represented an ideology of emancipation and positive social change. 2 While many of today's liberals instinctively recoil at the idea that they are somehow the proponents of a 'predatory neoliberalism' or apologists for 'liberal imperialism', the criticisms are hard to shake off -and perfectly legitimate. Like it or not, liberalism is a powerful presence in today's political landscape.
Indeed, it would not be much of a stretch to argue that liberalism is the only coherent global ideology of modern European history to have survived relatively unscathed into the twenty-first century. There are echoes of communism and socialism in European far-left America and beyond. 3 In some countries, liberals are reticent to describe themselves as such, but this does not necessarily mean that liberalism is absent. 4 It would be much more accurate to say that liberalism has expanded and adapted itself to very different contexts, even as other ideologies have atrophied or died.
Yet the multiple manifestations of liberalism in contemporary politics raise difficult questions for scholars of liberalism, the most significant of which is how to remain analytical without becoming an apologist. This problem is apparent here, as the books under consideration take a broadly sympathetic view of liberalism. This does not mean that all the authors or editors are liberals, although some of them quite clearly are, simply that they universally approach their subject matter within a liberal framework and accept the selfdefinition of liberals as marginal, but often brilliant, individuals seeking compromise in a dangerous world. In some cases, most obviously for the German-Jewish intellectuals that are the subject of Aschheim's essays, it is a deeply flawed compromise, but nevertheless one that is understandable and occasionally laudable. Liberalism, as it is presented here, is an ideology worth protecting.
Obviously, this particular slant means that anyone looking for a surgical dissection of liberal ideology or an indictment of liberal imperial arrogance is unlikely to be satisfied with any of these books. 5 And they certainly have a tendency to make liberalism and liberals appear rather less controversial than they were at key moments in European history. Still, these five books do have the benefit of focusing our attention on a number of conceptual 4 issues. Of these, three in particular stand out: first, whether it is possible to define liberalism in any kind of rigorous way; second, whether there are limits to liberalism and, if so, where these are and, finally, whether there is any fundamental difference between 'liberalism' and 'neoliberalism'. The authors in question do not give consistent answers to these questions, but the questions themselves are all vital to the study of liberalism. It therefore seems appropriate to deal with each one in turn -both as a way of assessing the contribution of each book to the existing literature and as a way of exploring the geographical and conceptual limitations of the field.
The Many Meanings of Liberalism
The question of how to define liberalism is one that has preoccupied generations of scholars. But it has the tendency to allow liberalism to swallow other ideologies and traditions. The claim, for instance, that republicanism was essentially another word for liberalism in late nineteenth-century France is a contentious one and downplays the importance of revolutionary, Jacobin and Napoleonic political traditions. 7 Moving forward chronologically, the short section (245-67) that deals with liberal economists in the 1930s -Keynes, Irving
Fisher and Hayek -is full of excellent details about these men and their work but fails to Apart from their intrinsic interest as points of abrupt ideological change, these moments also shed light on the meaning of liberalism, especially since liberals have often espoused 'moderation' or 'consensus' in the face of illiberal forces. 15 We can learn a great deal, not simply from the inner coherence of liberalism, but also from its outer edges.
There can be few better case studies of liberal collapse than the subject of Steven E. suggestive. As our understanding of neoliberalism develops in future, a good deal of attention is likely to focus on precisely these kinds of people. After all, it is not a few star thinkers who have made a hitherto marginal strand of liberalism into its pre-eminent expression, it is the vast army of 'second-hand dealers in ideas'. They may not make for the most edifying subject matter, but any attempt to explain the dissemination of neoliberalism will require a multifaceted study of the middle managers, management consultants and university administrators who speak its ideas every day.
The second major problem in the study of neoliberalism is the ideological context in which it developed. Those who argue that neoliberalism represents a new 'spirit of 15 capitalism' or a new 'rationality' tend to draw a straight line from Adam Smith to Alan Greenspan. 25 But this ignores the profound ideological changes that occurred in the 1970s.
Unfortunately, very little of the research on show here has anything to say about this. There is nothing on the collapse of a Marxist consensus amongst Europe's intelligentsia and the fragmentation of post-civil rights liberalism in the United States, both of which opened new intellectual spaces for more radical forms of liberalism. 26 There is also very little on the turn away from Keynesian economic policies in Europe and the rise of 'anti-government'
Republicanism in the United States, except brief mentions in Fawcett's book. 27 The only contribution that enlarges our perspective on the intellectual contexts for the emergence of neoliberalism is Samuel Moyn's short chapter on the French debate on 'rights' in the 1980s. 28 By analysing the writings of Claude Lefort and his student Marcel Gauchet, Moyn explores whether the growth of rights discourse in France in this period can be described as 'liberal'.
His answer is ambiguous. On the one hand, the desire to rehabilitate rights was an attempt to elaborate a post-Marxist framework for ethical politics -one that might be described as 'liberal'; on the other, both Lefort and Gauchet were sceptical of the individualist underpinnings of rights talk. This scepticism ran counter to the neoliberal revival that was taking place at the time.
Moyn's analysis points to the urgent need for further study of how neoliberalism interacted with the fractured and shifting ideological landscape of the 1970s. 29 The cliché -especially prevalent in France -that the '68 generation went from student radicals to investment bankers implies that it was a story of substitution (of neoliberalism for radical leftism) and disillusionment (with revolutionary politics). 30 But this obscures a myriad of other engagements and positions. It also forgets the non-Western variant of this story, something of which all the publications under review are guilty. 31 Because, despite what anticapitalist thinkers have argued, neoliberalism is not simply a Western construct; it has been 16 adopted all over the world. Inevitably, it has been a tool of neo-imperialism -one thinks of the IMF's structural adjustment policies of the 1990s or even the budgetary austerity imposed on Europe since 2008 -but this does not mean that neoliberalism 'belongs' exclusively to the West. From Augusto Pinochet to Narendra Modi, neoliberalism has taken on specific and powerful local variants. If we are to explain how and why we live in a neoliberal world, we must broaden our horizons.
This raises a subsidiary question: is it really possible to write the history of liberalism without also writing a history of anti-liberalism? 32 The books and articles here overwhelmingly paint a picture of a liberalism thwarted by circumstance and undone by its lack of killer instinct, while liberals continuously appear to be apologising for themselves.
Such a skewed view is not necessarily inaccurate. Sloman, in particular, makes an eloquent case for a British liberalism lost at sea in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Yet it is obvious that for liberalism to survive the better part of three centuries it has had to be more than simply an apologia for rational thinking and sensible government; it has also had to 
